Intermediaries and Private Speech Regulation: A Transatlantic Dialogue - Workshop Report by Li, Tiffany
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
2019 
Intermediaries and Private Speech Regulation: A Transatlantic 
Dialogue - Workshop Report 
Tiffany Li 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Internet Law Commons 
  
 
 
 
 
Intermediaries & Private Speech Regulation:  
A Transatlantic Dialogue 
 
September 28, 2018 
 
 
 
Workshop Report 
By: Tiffany Li1 
 
 
 
 
Co-Hosted by the Yale Law School Information Society Project  
and the Stanford Center for Internet and Society 
  
                                                 
1 Report written by Tiffany Li, Resident Fellow, Information Society Project, with gratitude to: Daphne Keller for 
initiating and shepherding the creative processes behind this project; Martin Husovec and Joris van Hoboken for 
substantial contributions in formulizing this workshop and its themes; Rebecca Crootof for extensive edits and 
review; Jack Balkin for his constant guidance; and ISP Fellows Patricia Vargas, Leila Chang, Christina Spiesel, 
Laurin Weissinger, and Nikolas Guggenberger for their assistance; as well as to all workshop participants for an 
insightful discussion. This event was hosted by the Wikimedia/Yale Law School Initiative on Intermediaries and 
Information, an initiative of the Yale Law School Information Society Project, and the Stanford Center for Internet 
and Society, with support from the Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund at Yale Law School. 
 Table of Contents 
 
 
Overview .............................................................................................................................. 1 
Themes ................................................................................................................................. 2 
Free Expression Protections and Intermediary Liability ..................................................... 3 
United States and Europe: Learning From Each Other ................................................................3 
Past and Present Themes and Questions .......................................................................................4 
Changing Political Economy .........................................................................................................5 
Government vs. Private Industry ..................................................................................................6 
Black Letter Law and Facts on the Ground ......................................................................... 7 
Lessons from Media and Telecom Regulation ...............................................................................7 
The E.U. Approach: Human Rights and Consumer Law ..............................................................7 
The U.S. Approach: The First Amendment and Property Rights..................................................8 
Due Process Concerns ...................................................................................................................8 
Distinguishing Intermediaries and Harms ....................................................................................9 
Moving EU-US Dialogues Forward .................................................................................... 10 
International Cooperation .......................................................................................................... 10 
Prior Restraint ............................................................................................................................ 10 
Practical Strategies ..................................................................................................................... 11 
Future Models for Private Speech Regulation .................................................................... 12 
Information Fiduciaries .............................................................................................................. 12 
New Sources of Remedy for Harms ............................................................................................ 12 
Evaluating New Models .............................................................................................................. 13 
Systemic Solutions ...................................................................................................................... 13 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 15 
Workshop Agenda .............................................................................................................. 17 
Workshop Participants ...................................................................................................... 20 
Workshop Organizers ........................................................................................................ 21 
 
 
  
 1 
Overview 
 
 
On September 28, 2018, the Wikimedia/Yale Law School Initiative on Intermediaries and 
Information (WIII) hosted an intensive, day-long workshop entitled “Intermediaries and Private 
Speech Regulation: A Transatlantic Dialogue.” The Yale Information Society Project (ISP) and 
the Stanford Center for Internet and Society (CIS) co-hosted this event, with support from the 
Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund at Yale Law School. This intimate, invitation-only academic 
workshop took place at Yale Law School. 
 
For this workshop, WIII and CIS convened leading experts from the United States and the 
European Union for a series of non-public, guided discussions. Participants discussed the 
complicated issue of private speech regulation and the connections between platform liability 
laws and fundamental rights, including free expression.  
 
This report presents a synthesized collection of ideas and questions raised by one or more of the 
experts during the event, providing an overview of theoretical ideas, practical experiences, and 
directions for further research on rapidly evolving questions of intermediary liability from a 
uniquely transatlantic perspective. Nothing in this report reflects the individual opinions of 
participants or their affiliated institutions. 
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Themes2 
 
 
Governments around the world are increasingly turning to private internet platforms as de facto 
regulators of internet users’ speech. In the United States, newly enacted legislation has expanded 
internet intermediaries’ liability for users’ communications for the first time in two decades. In 
the European Union, the Commission has proposed making social media companies proactively 
monitor and remove user communications relating to terrorism. Pressure to combat violent 
extremism has already led to troubling errors – including platforms removing political speech, 
videos posted by human rights organizations, and users’ discussions of Islamic religious topics. 
 
One key theme for this workshop was whether constitutional and human rights frameworks place 
any limits on laws that will foreseeably lead private platforms to silence lawful speech. It may be 
possible for states to effectively bypass limitations on their own authority by deploying private 
companies without appropriate safeguards. This indirect regulation of speech would create a host 
of problems for individual rights. In the United States, few courts have had to confront these 
issues in the internet age. Older cases, though, have held that poorly formulated liability rules for 
“analog intermediaries,” such as bookstores, could violate the First Amendment.3 
 
Courts and thinkers outside the United States have brought increasing attention to these 
questions in recent years. The Supreme Courts of India and Argentina both rejected intermediary 
liability rules that would incentivize cautious platforms to silence large swathes of lawful 
speech.4 The European Court of Human Rights and Court of Justice of the European Union have 
both identified users’ expression and privacy rights as limiting factors for platform liability 
rules.5 The prevailing political winds in Europe, however, appear to favor ever increasing 
platform responsibility for eliminating unlawful content.  
 
This event brought together a transatlantic group of scholars of constitutional and human rights 
law to discuss connections between platform liability laws and fundamental rights, including free 
expression. This discussion was particularly timely in light of of developments ranging from the 
proposed E.U. Terrorist Content Regulation to Facebook’s announcement of an external, multi-
stakeholder ‘Supreme Court’ for content takedown decisions,6 as well as likely litigation 
challenging the constitutionality of FOSTA – the first U.S. law in twenty years to substantially 
expand platforms’ legal responsibility for user speech and developments in Europe around 
“illegal content online.”7 
                                                 
2 This section of the report borrows significantly from framing materials co-authored by Daphne Keller, with 
contributions from Martin Husovec and Joris van Hoboken. 
3 See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
4 See, e.g., Singhal v. India, A.I.R. 2015 S.C. 1523; Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National 
Supreme Court of Justice], 29/10/2014, “Rodriguez María Belen c/Google y Otro s/ daños y perjuicios” (Arg.). 
5 See Daphne Keller, New Intermediary Liability Cases from the European Court of Human Rights: What Will They 
Mean in the Real World?, CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOC’Y (April 11, 2016), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/04/new-intermediary-liability-cases-european-court -human-rights-what-
will-they-mean-real (last accessed Jan. 17, 2019). 
6 See Kate Klonick & Thomas Kadri, How to Make Facebook’s ‘Supreme Court’ Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 
2018). https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/17/opinion/facebook-supreme-court-speech.html. 
7 See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act, H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. (2018). 
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Free Expression Protections and Intermediary Liability 
 
 
United States and Europe: Learning From Each Other 
 
American lawyers and legal scholars have much to learn from Europe concerning intermediary 
liability and speech regulation. First, while the United States has some case law concerning 
intermediaries and speech,8 there is a much larger body of European case law concerning these 
issues. Participants suggested that U.S. lawyers can gain valuable knowledge, including practical 
litigation strategies, from European cases. Second, internationally, the United States is an outlier 
in the field of intermediary regulation. Few jurisdictions are even attempting to adapt or apply 
the intermediary regulation models of America’s CDA 230 or First Amendment speech 
protections, generally.9 Third, E.U. internet policy is only growing in influence and is shaping 
the development of global internet policy, as evidenced by the widespread application of the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). For these reasons and more, U.S. lawyers and legal 
scholars can and should learn from European perspectives and experiences on intermediary 
regulation, particularly concerning free expression.  
 
Because many of the early and large tech platforms came from the United States, many scholars 
believe that early internet culture reflected primarily American values, including the particularly 
American conception of free speech as a paramount value and a general willingness to allow for 
companies to innovate in a free market system with limited regulation. In the European Union 
and internationally, human rights models often strive more to balance competing rights, such as 
rights to privacy, with rights to free expression. There has also been a history of negative 
sentiment against U.S. tech companies for their dominant market power, growing political and 
social influence, and frequent refusals to comply with local laws and norms. Some of the major 
American tech companies have successfully moved much of their tax flow out of the European 
Union, which may be one reason why it has ramped up regulation of intermediaries and tech 
companies in recent years. 
 
The European Union has been growing in influence on intermediary and online speech 
regulation matters. For example, the Hate Speech Code of Conduct10 and the Audio Visual 
Media Services Directive11 are influential laws imposing duties and obligations on 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
8 See, e.g., Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Center for Democracy & 
Technology v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d606 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
9 Though the United States has arguably succeeded in exporting some U.S. internet regulations through trade 
agreements, particularly provisions amounting to compliance with DMCA standards.  
10 See Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online, European Commission, May 31, 2016, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/code_of_conduct_on_countering_illegal_hate_speech_online_en.pdf 
11 See European Parliament legislative resolution of 2 October 2018 on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services 
in view of changing market realities (COM(2016)0287 – C8-0193/2016 – 2016/0151(COD)). 
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intermediaries. The European Commission has also been quite active on issues concerning 
copyright, extremist speech, hate speech, and political manipulation in online content. 
 
Intermediary regulation in Europe differs from intermediary regulation in the United States, 
partially due to different understandings of fundamental rights such as free expression and 
privacy rights. Broadly speaking, in the United States, the unique “free speech maximalist” 
culture places great value on free speech and free expression. In the European Union, cultural 
values focus more on dignitary human rights as a whole, balancing free expression and 
information rights against other human rights.  
 
Differences in value systems have influenced how the internet has developed. However, 
participants as this workshop emphasized that it is important to remember that the United States 
and Europe have more in common than not, at least concerning general human rights values and 
democratic principles. Focusing too much on the differences can lead to unproductive division of 
resources and intellectual efforts. 
 
Past and Present Themes and Questions 
 
Participants evaluated the ways in which the intermediary and speech regulation environment has 
drastically changed in just the past few decades. Since the first developments in intermediary 
liability law, a number of key changes have occurred that merit attention. 
 
The world of intermediary and speech regulation has expanded. Online speech regulation is no 
longer solely a U.S. and E.U. matter, but a truly global regulatory landscape. Furthermore, the 
question today is not simply how to conceptualize and regulate internet intermediaries, but also 
how to conceptualize and regulate the growing data economy. Internet intermediary debates have 
transitioned from a focus on content takedowns to now emphasizing topics such as Big Data, 
machine learning, artificial intelligence, and tools for regulating and enforcing data protection. 
 
In the early days of the internet, many believed that intermediaries served an important function 
in supporting a free environment for public discourse. While many still believe this today, there 
is also growing concern over negative effects that some intermediaries may have on public 
discourse. For example, one negative effect of the rise of intermediaries could be the increased 
reach of online political disinformation campaigns on social media networks.  
 
If intermediaries continue to exist as relatively open platforms, they may have to practice more 
gatekeeping functions, possibly including ex ante speech restrictions. This could include, for 
example, a social media platform blocking certain content from posting to the public view. 
Increasing the gatekeeping responsibilities of intermediaries may be positive, in that 
intermediaries could better support a healthy speech environment. On the other hand, this 
strengthening of intermediaries’ gatekeeping functions could also lead to greater censorship and 
restrictions on free speech online.  
 
Furthermore, if more mediation of online speech is deemed necessary or beneficial for a healthy 
speech environment, there is still the question of who should be responsible for determining the 
standards of online speech. Governments can set these standards through laws and regulation. 
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Courts can adjust these standards through legal interpretation. Companies themselves can also 
set standards through platform-specific rules or industry self-regulation. The role of civil society 
is also important in creating new standards for online speech. The ultimate goal for any new 
online speech regulation should be to best protect the ability for intermediaries to provide space 
for free expression online, while still protecting against destructive or harmful speech. 
 
One topic of debate among workshop participants was whether the decentralized model of online 
speech is still relevant or practicable in today’s internet environment – and whether it should be 
protected in an age of increasing consolidation. The early internet provided space for many small 
intermediary providers, but today, a number of large companies dominate the online space. As 
one participant put it, the “edge of the internet” may be lost already. The market dominance of 
the large tech platforms has affected the online public sphere and will likely continue to do so as 
platforms grow in size and influence. The centralization of power in a small group of internet 
companies may be a threat to the decentralized discourse model of online speech.  
 
New solutions may be needed to protect the potential for decentralized discourse on the internet, 
at risk in today’s more centralized internet economy. Some participants suggested that antitrust 
regulation is a solution, while others argued that this will not solve the core problem and may 
have additional negative consequences. Others raised the prospect of a blockchain-enabled 
decentralized web. A few participants also questioned whether the entire conversation around 
“the distributed web” has changed, and pointed out that the conversation may now be a moot 
point. The distributed web may no longer even be an actualizable ideal. 
 
Changing Political Economy 
 
A larger systemic question is how the political economy has changed since the early days of 
internet intermediaries. Many scholars used to believe that intermediaries would allow for free 
flow of information, regardless of government regulations. However, it is now apparent that 
intermediary companies must comply with government regulations and often with government 
requests as well. Effectively, individuals may be losing one check on government regulation of 
speech through the loss of an unregulated tech industry.  
 
One way states can target regulatory models is to create different regulations for different 
companies, based on size of company, number of users, market power, or other similar metrics. 
Large technology companies like the “Big 4” or “GAFA” (Google, Amazon, Facebook, and 
Apple) have the power to make specific handshake agreements with governments through a 
diplomacy model of negotiation. These companies can negotiate for favorable exceptions to 
intermediary liability regulations that may be difficult for other companies to follow. Small 
companies are unable to negotiate with states on this scale. This makes it difficult for small 
companies to compete. Perhaps the law can address this disparity and level the playing field by 
making stratified regulations that target companies based on size or financial status. 
 
Classically, governments set regulations, and companies leave jurisdictions if they dislike the 
regulations. This is a “capital flow political economy.” However, today, companies often act 
akin to nation-states. As discussed in Frank Pasquale’s work, intermediaries and large tech 
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companies are now more like market makers and sovereigns, not market participants.12 The 
relationship between companies and governments is now more like diplomacy, not capital flow. 
The model is the relationship between Denmark and Germany, not North Carolina and a 
furniture manufacturer. Companies and governments engage in negotiation and accommodation. 
Some participants argued that this is not a new dynamic; when economic power concentrates, 
there will always be “a dance between government and industry.”  
 
Some participants suggested looking to the GDPR as a model, as it uses a principle-based 
approach that effectively places greater burdens on larger companies without specifically making 
distinctions based on size of company. Europe’s proposed Copyright Directive Article 13 also, in 
some drafts, creates greater responsibilities for “platforms that host a large amount of content.”13  
 
Government vs. Private Industry 
 
In recent years, there has been a growing trend of governments leveraging the Terms of Service 
of internet intermediaries to request that intermediaries take down online content, in lieu of 
governments regulating the online content or speech directly. Effectively, governments have 
used and are using corporate terms of service and corporate content takedown mechanisms and 
processes as a form of indirect speech regulation. Leveraging corporate takedown processes is 
often faster and easier for governments than going through legal procedures for blocking or 
removing speech. However, this indirect speech regulation is also much less transparent, and 
there is little or no accountability or redress for citizens whose speech have been silenced. When 
states use intermediaries as proxies for speech regulation, this has an impact on rights to free 
speech and free expression. 
 
In the realm of online speech regulation, it appears that there are two main regulators of speech – 
companies (through corporate takedown processes) and governments (through direct speech 
regulation and through leveraging of corporate takedown procedures and other indirect speech 
regulation). Democratic governments are accountable to their citizens, and corporations are 
accountable to shareholders and consumers. However, industry is also dependent on the state for 
regulatory approval, taxes, and so on.  
 
It is simple to default to viewing the speech regulation problem as a dichotomy between 
government control and industry control. Individuals would then have to decide whether they 
trust their governments more than they trust tech companies. Ideally, the law should protect 
against abuses from each. However, there may also be alternative or additional models that 
include either hybrid state-industry regulatory regimes or models that give greater weight to civil 
society and to individuals. Some participants argued that this is one reason supporting the need 
for a vibrant civil society that is not beholden to either the government or the industry. While 
individuals often can pursue a right of action against private companies, states should also 
protect individuals’ rights as well. One participant noted that state responsibility to protect 
individuals’ rights could extend to protecting individuals’ rights against intermediary companies. 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, From Territorial to Functional Sovereignty: The Case of Amazon, LAW & POLITICAL 
ECONOMY BLOG (December 6, 2017), https://lpeblog.org/2017/12/06/from-territorial-to-functional-sovereignty-the-
case-of-amazon/ (last visited January 17, 2019). 
13 Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 2016/0280(COD). 
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Black Letter Law and Facts on the Ground  
 
 
Different legal and regulatory doctrines can apply when discussing the regulation of 
intermediaries and online speech. By analyzing failures and noting successes, academics and 
advocates can create better models for future regulations of online speech. 
 
Lessons from Media and Telecom Regulation 
 
Many believe that online speech regulation can be modeled after or at least take inspiration from 
media and telecommunications regulation. But, with the rise and ubiquity of internet 
intermediaries, some have argued that there may no longer be many material differences between 
intermediaries like Facebook and telecommunications providers like Comcast. However, many 
participants believed there still to be a difference between internet intermediaries and 
telecommunications companies. Fundamentally, broadband telecommunications are still 
essentials, but internet intermediaries have not reached that level of essentiality yet.14 This could 
be because these are simply different markets, but also because there is still a lower barrier of 
entry for market competitors seeking to participate in the internet space versus the 
telecommunications sector. Thus, while future internet regulations can look to telecom 
regulations for inspiration, there may not be enough support for entirely regulating these sectors 
in the same way. 
 
Some participants suggested using a common carrier model for intermediaries who host or 
provide access to content. Under such a model, the government could mandate that a platform 
carry content. Consumers could have a right to have their content carried or hosted by an 
intermediary service and could potentially have a right to consumer protection claims on this 
matter. However, the common carrier model does not currently apply to user-facing content 
platforms like Facebook or YouTube and it is unlikely that this model will be transferred whole 
cloth to intermediary liability law.15 Furthermore, the terms of service of many intermediaries 
include mandatory arbitration clauses that could bar some types of consumer protection claims.  
 
The E.U. Approach: Human Rights and Consumer Law 
 
Some participants claimed that, in the European Union, human rights and consumer law are often 
more intermingled than they are in the United States. Using this approach could allow for 
regulation of both private companies and non-profits and educational organizations, without 
necessitating the creation of multiple regulations differentiated by type of intermediary. As one 
                                                 
14 See Annemarie Bridy, Remediating Social Media: A Layer-Conscious Approach, 24 BOSTON U. J. SCI. AND TECH. 
L. 193 (2018). 
15 See Daphne Keller, Who Do You Sue? State and Platform Hybrid Power Over Online Speech, Aegis Series Paper 
No. 1902, Jan. 29, 2019, available at 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-do-you-sue-state-and-platform-hybrid-power-over-online-speech (last accessed 
Mar. 8, 2019). 
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workshop participant noted, “The European approach could be a better approach than simply 
creating a consumer regulation but putting Github and Wikipedia in a footnote.”  
 
Aleksandra Kuczerawy’s work was widely discussed.16 Participants especially honed in on the 
idea that, through the E-Commerce Directive, the European Union is indirectly incentivizing 
intermediaries to interfere with private speech. There is no explicit mass carrier obligation in the 
Directive, but there is also no due process for individuals. Thus, there is again the problem 
discussed in other sessions of indirect speech regulation causing a deficit of due process rights 
for individuals against the state. 
 
The U.S. Approach: The First Amendment and Property Rights 
 
The property interest runs deep in U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence. Generally speaking, 
property owners have the right to not have First Amendment speech regulations interfere with 
their private property rights. If lawmakers seek to apply this to the intermediary context, the key 
problem then is defining what counts as property or ownership over content or speech online.  
 
There is a line of U.S. cases known as the “shopping mall cases” or “company town cases”17 
concerning the conflict between First Amendment rights and private property rights. In these 
cases, the Supreme Court considered whether individuals had the right to exercise First 
Amendment free speech rights while situated in or on the outskirts or private properties that 
were, to various degrees, open to the public. These cases are relevant to understanding 
intermediary liability protections. For example, one can easily draw comparisons between a 
private corporation’s online intermediary platform and a private corporation’s physical shopping 
mall. Both the intermediary platform and the shopping mall can serve as spaces or venues for 
speech or expression. 
 
Some cases on First Amendment constraints on government can also be analogized or applied to 
the notice and takedown process for internet intermediaries. These include Smith v California18 
or Bantam Books v. Sullivan,19 in which the Court held that bookstores are not liable for selling 
books with obscene content.   
 
Due Process Concerns 
 
When governments indirectly regulate private speech by incentivizing, advising, or forcing 
private companies to take down content, individuals lose due process rights. Users often claim 
they lack due process when dealing with content platforms. For example, sometimes users argue 
that they have little recourse when platforms remove their content. However, these 
intermediaries are mostly private companies, so consumers do not have legal due process rights 
                                                 
16Aleksandra, Kuczerawy, Safeguards for Freedom of Expression in the Era of Online Gatekeeping, Auteurs & 
Media (forthcoming, 2019). 
17 See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, 
424 U.S. 507 (1976); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 
(1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
18 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
19 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
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as they would against the state.20 This changes when states pursue indirect private speech 
regulation, because then individuals should have those rights. 
 
Participants debated whether a “must carry” obligation might be incompatible with due process 
or might make due process irrelevant. (A “must carry” obligation may make takedowns 
impossible, thus eliminating the need for a recourse to wrongful takedowns.) The two concepts 
may exist on opposite sides of a spectrum (between strong government enforcement of speech 
regulation online and complete libertarian freedom for platforms). Alternatively, some 
participants argued that a must carry obligation was integral to providing for due process.  As 
one said, “What’s left of due process without ‘must carry?’ Just transparency reports?” 
 
Distinguishing Intermediaries and Harms 
 
One common complaint among the participants was that existing regulations are overly broad. 
Policymakers should avoid creating overly broad regulations and instead tailor regulations 
narrowly to best address consumer harms. One way to do this might be to craft regulations that 
distinguish between types of intermediaries or perhaps between types of harms.  
 
Participants debated the best way to distinguish between different types of intermediaries, for the 
purpose of properly tailoring regulations to address harms. One option is differentiating by size. 
There are a few reasons this could be useful. Larger companies may have more resources and 
more political power, making them uniquely able to comply with more stringent rules. There 
may also be greater need to regulate companies as they grow more powerful. Intermediaries with 
greater numbers of users may deserve more regulation (or more stringent regulation) for similar 
reasons, as well as the simple fact that more consumers will be affected or protected by 
regulations aimed at large companies or companies with large user bases. However, 
differentiating intermediaries by size is difficult. It is unclear where to draw the line. 
Additionally, a smaller company or one with fewer users might still have deep impact on users 
and ability to harm or protect users.  
 
Another option for tailoring regulations is to craft regulations tailored toward protecting or 
managing different types of speech. For example, there could be regulations specifically aimed 
toward regulating defamation, child protection issues, and so on. Many jurisdictions already have 
laws like this. In the United States, broadly speaking, there are some established laws for types 
of harms, including intellectual property infringement and online defamation. These regulations 
do not affect First Amendment rights. This is one model for looking at future speech regulations. 
 
  
                                                 
20 Some participants suggested that states should incentivize platforms to create procedures for due process 
concerning user speech; states can do this by offering legal immunity for platforms that provide such rights for uses. 
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Moving EU-US Dialogues Forward 
 
 
In this session, participants discussed strategies to reconcile differences between America and 
Europe, with the goal of making better regulations moving forward. Of great debate was the 
question of who should make decisions for regulating speech: governments or “the market.” 
Some participants noted that “the real fear is when they act together.” 
 
International Cooperation 
 
It is possible to create international standards for speech regulation. Collaboration between 
countries on some speech issues can be helpful. For example, states often collaborate on 
investigations for violent extremism and child protection related content. However, others argued 
that there was a lack of transparency in many of these multi-stakeholder processes. Additionally, 
if different jurisdictions develop different regulations, states may have incentive to simply turn 
over certain cases to other countries to achieve the same objectives while avoiding a state action 
problem.  
 
While one participant offered ICANN as a model for international cooperation, others noted that 
the organization lacked transparency, with “entire domains disappearing all the time.” Though 
ICANN may be an imperfect organization, it does provide an example of internet governance on 
a global scale. 
 
Prior Restraint 
 
Of much discussion was the phenomenon of states using intermediaries to regulate private 
speech, effectively a form of prior restraint. This can be in the form of governments directly 
asking intermediaries to take down certain pieces of content. Another method often used by 
states is when states refer to a company’s own terms of service and recommend (either directly, 
or through a third party) that pieces of content be taken down, not for violation of law, but for 
violation of terms of service. Some of the third parties often used in these scenarios include 
relatively neutral NGOs. Often, these include Internet Research Units (IRUs). 
 
Most agreed that government use of terms of service for content takedowns was a negative form 
of prior restraint of speech. This form of speech regulation without judicial oversight has 
negative consequences for free speech and free expression rights, both in the United States and 
European Union.  
 
Another permutation of this form of prior restraint occurs when states give notice to companies 
that content may be illegal, but this notice does not include any formal determination of legality 
or any recommendation for the company. Technically, the company then can still make its own 
determination and does not have to take anything down. However, if the content does turn out to 
be illegal, and the company did not take it down, the state can say that the company had notice. 
Thus, effectively, the state is still regulating private speech through the intermediary companies. 
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Practical Strategies 
 
Participants discussed practical strategies to push against the growing trend of governments 
using intermediary takedowns as a form of private speech regulation. Participants generally 
agreed on three main immediate strategies: (1) calling for greater government transparency, 
through the FOIA process or through NGO audits; (2) working with companies to gather 
information, for use in academic and policy research; and (3) advocating for individuals and 
groups who have been disproportionately harmed. Additionally, other forms of advocacy were 
also suggested, including amicus briefs, policy papers, and impact litigation. 
 
The first problem to solve is how to obtain evidence concerning platforms’ content removal 
efforts and the relative role of state and private actors. Information would be needed regarding 
content takedowns (number, source, scale, type, reason, third party involvement), handshake 
agreements between states and companies, and impact on users (for example, whether speech 
was chilled). Some participants suggested using FOIA to find out what information is being 
taken down at government request. However, others demurred, noting that the FOIA process was 
often slow and inefficient and it would require knowing exactly which agencies were requesting 
which content removals from which companies. Also, others noted that much of the information 
would likely not be made publicly available, especially given existing statutory exceptions 
(particularly those related to extremism). Ultimately, most agreed that it was still one helpful 
avenue of approach.  
 
Participants also suggested working with affected companies, both for information gathering and 
to advocate for better policies and processes. Companies could provide as much information as 
they are legally allowed on takedown requests from governments or from known third parties 
used in these processes. A neutral third party, potentially an academic center or NGO, could then 
collect and publish the data from multiple companies. This would allow for more informed 
research. With the actual numbers, advocates would have stronger cases for impact litigation and 
for policy proposals. Some positive examples of transparency projects include the Lumen 
database and the U.K. audit of the Internet Watch Foundation. One particularly important object 
of additional transparency and scrutiny would be the terrorism hash database. 
 
For impact litigation, some participants suggested that the ideal plaintiffs would be smaller 
intermediaries, which are impacted by these processes but, unlike larger ones, do not have the 
ability to negotiate their own arrangements with states. Participants noted that the United States 
was probably not the best first choice for impact litigation, possibly simply because the United 
States has a longer history of intermediary liability and speech law. This longer history of laws 
and greater number of cases on these issues may make future litigation more complicated.  Some 
suggested Germany, due to beneficial case law on fundamental rights. The Dutch Constitution 
also has an absolute ban on prior restraint on speech, which could make the Netherlands a strong 
candidate for impact litigation.   
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Future Models for Private Speech Regulation 
 
 
Information Fiduciaries 
 
Participants discussed the “information fiduciaries” model of intermediary and online speech 
regulations. This conceptual model was developed by Jack Balkin21 and refined with 
collaboration from Jonathan Zittrain and others.22 Essentially, the model places fiduciary-like 
duties on intermediary platforms – duties of care, confidentiality, and loyalty to users. This is due 
to the relationship platforms now have with users. Users trust platforms to handle great amounts 
of private data; therefore, platforms are already acting in a quasi-fiduciary capacity. 
 
There was some debate as to whether the information fiduciary model would impose any 
obligations on platforms for content moderation. While some participants believed that content 
moderation obligations should follow from fiduciary responsibility, others disagreed. They 
believed that platforms only have an obligation to not engage in “data manipulation,” which 
Balkin has defined as the use of data to benefit platforms while simultaneously exploiting and 
harming users. Balkin has noted that content moderation is only relevant insofar as content 
moderation policies involve deliberate manipulation of end users and/or promote end user 
addiction. However, others argued that that definition was too limited and that fiduciary duties 
should be construed more broadly to include content moderation. 
 
Some disagreed with the information fiduciary model, arguing that companies already have 
duties of care toward consumers, under existing bodies of law. Others noted that duties of care 
and loyalty to users may sometimes conflict. For example, a platform attempting to satisfy a duty 
of care might have a responsibility to give users “good” or “safe” content only. But the same 
platform, attempting to satisfy its duty of loyalty, might instead choose to simply give the user 
content that the user wants or expects to see. Another question concerns how companies might 
balance duties to consumers with human rights; fiduciary responsibilities may imply that 
platforms owe more to their users than to universal human rights.  
 
Legally, some argued that fiduciary duties could create groundwork for governments to regulate 
more because this could bring online speech into the realm of contract law. One participant 
offered a tongue-in-cheek response: “How do we contract around the First Amendment?” 
 
New Sources of Remedy for Harms 
 
There will always be room for new models for regulating any sector. As one participant noted, 
“the law tends to want to provide a remedy for harm.” In the past, governments could regulate 
content producers for content-related harms. However, today, these content makers no longer are 
the ones with money or power; they cannot as readily be called upon to remedy harms. Instead, 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016). 
22 See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, How to Exercise the Power You Didn't Ask For, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sep. 19, 2018), 
https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-to-exercise-the-power-you-didnt-ask-for. 
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intermediaries have the financial and political power. Thus, it is likely that motivated plaintiffs – 
and hence the law – will adapt and find a new source for remedy.  
 
Evaluating New Models 
 
Participants disagreed on whether the GDPR was a good model for future speech regulation. 
However, most agreed that the GDPR was a strong model, at least in terms of successful 
procedural creation of a new regulation with international reach. Advocates can learn from the 
process of GDPR’s creation in calling for and crafting new standards. 
 
Some noted that future regulations should embrace functional distinctions between types of 
intermediaries or types of harms – essentially, that regulations were overbroad. Others remarked 
that regulations were instead not broad enough, that they ought to focus more on big picture 
issues, not on “odd little bits of bad content.” 
 
There are a number of regulations in the European Union (and in some other jurisdictions) that 
require companies to take down problematic content such as hate speech or extremist content 
very quickly. There was general agreement that regulations calling for very fast content 
takedown timelines would likely fail in the long term, as it is difficult for most companies to 
comply with such regulations. However, governments and policymakers often face political 
pressure to solve problems related to concerns like intellectual property infringement and 
extremism. This is likely what sparks many of the overly simplistic regulations that call for 
companies to take down content as fast as they can. These regulations may be short-sighted. 
 
Systemic Solutions 
 
Some participants argued that regulations should focus on systemic or architectural changes that 
platforms could implement, not pieces of content.  
 
One concept currently of discussion in Europe is imposing a new duty of care for platforms – 
essentially, making platforms face legal consequences for having inadequate overall systems and 
processes, not for the inevitable individual failures where bad content stays up. This concept of 
duty of care could align with the information fiduciaries framework. Regulations focused on 
these overall duties would likely require or incentivize systemic or architectural solutions. 
 
Regulating on the systemic level could be easier and more effective than attempting to regulate 
content, as content regulation runs into many issues with speech and expression rights. For 
example, there could be new regulations specifically mandating impact assessments for 
algorithms in content moderation. This would be a discrete, specific regulation that would target 
a known harm with relatively practical steps to ameliorate.  
 
On a practical level, some participants asked how architectural solutions could be 
operationalized. One example of an architectural solution could be creating a hate speech 
detecting algorithm that would then trigger a pop-up asking the user, “Are you sure you want to 
say this?” It remains to be seen how platforms might be encouraged or forced to implement 
architectural solutions. Governments could create incentives to persuade platforms to enact these 
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high-level changes. Public consumer pressure may also incentivize companies to implement 
these solutions. 
 
Many believed in the importance of existing procedural frameworks, including transparency 
reporting and risk management procedures for platforms. Additional proposed solutions 
included: a system of random audition, where one of every hundred content takedown decisions 
gets reviewed by a court or other outside body; new impact assessments for types of content or 
for types of moderation, such as algorithmic moderation; enforcing transparency in terms of 
service; and creating algorithms “that work in the public interest” to check algorithms used in 
content moderation. 
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Conclusion 
 
American and European lawyers and legal scholars have much to learn from each other 
concerning legal and policy issues related to intermediary liability and online speech regulation. 
While the development of the early internet and many of today’s large tech platforms may reflect 
primarily American values (particularly regarding free speech and limited regulation innovation), 
today’s internet ecosystem is also shaped by the growing influence of the European Union. 
While the United States tends toward a free speech maximalist culture, Europe tends to focus on 
dignitary human rights, balancing free speech and expression rights against other human rights. 
However, participants as this workshop emphasized that the United States and Europe have more 
in common than not, at least concerning general human rights values and democratic principles. 
Focusing too much on the differences can lead to unproductive division of resources and 
intellectual efforts. 
 
Since the first developments in intermediary liability law, a number of key changes have 
occurred that merit attention. Online speech regulation is no longer solely a U.S. and E.U. 
matter, but a truly global regulatory landscape. Furthermore, the question today is not simply 
how to conceptualize and regulate internet intermediaries, but also how to conceptualize and 
regulate the growing data economy. Further research should be done to expand the scope of these 
discussions to other regions of the world as well. 
 
Today, there is growing concern over negative effects that some intermediaries may have on 
public discourse. If intermediaries continue to exist as relatively open platforms, they may have 
to practice more gatekeeping functions. However, this could lead to problems due to lack of due 
process or transparency. Large tech companies often act akin to nation-states, with the largest 
intermediary companies having as much negotiation power as nation-states. The increasingly 
disparate power of a few large tech platforms may also lead to a loss of decentralized discourse 
and increased difficulties for new competitors to enter the market. Perhaps the law can address 
this disparity and level the playing field by making stratified regulations that target companies 
based on size or financial status. 
 
In the realm of online speech regulation, it appears that there are two main regulators of speech – 
companies (through corporate takedown processes) and governments (through direct speech 
regulation and through leveraging of corporate takedown procedures and other indirect speech 
regulation). Ideally, the law should protect against abuses from each. However, there may also be 
alternative or additional models that include either hybrid state-industry regulatory regimes or 
models that give greater weight to civil society and to individuals. 
 
Policymakers should avoid creating overly broad regulations and instead tailor regulations 
narrowly to best address consumer harms. One way to do this might be to craft regulations that 
distinguish between types of intermediaries or between types of harms. Another option for 
tailoring regulations is to craft regulations tailored toward protecting or managing different types 
of speech. Future regulatory models for protecting free expression online can look to: U.S. legal 
concepts from media and telecommunications regulations, including the “must carry” obligation 
and consumer protection law; U.S. First Amendment and property law doctrine; European 
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human rights law regarding freedom of expression; and precedent from both the United States 
and Europe regarding due process. Other new models that can be useful in shaping future 
regulation include the information fiduciaries model and parts of the GDPR. Another option 
could be incentivizing systemic, architectural solutions on the part of companies. 
 
One problem for free speech rights is the phenomenon of states using intermediaries to regulate 
private speech, effectively a form of prior restraint. Effectively, governments have used and are 
using corporate terms of service and corporate content takedown mechanisms and processes as a 
form of indirect speech regulation. This indirect speech regulation is also much less transparent, 
and there is no accountability or redress for citizens whose speech has been silenced. When 
states use intermediaries as proxies for speech regulation, this has a negative impact on rights to 
free speech and free expression. Practical strategies to fight against this problem include: (1) 
calling for greater government transparency, through the FOIA process or through NGO audits; 
(2) working with companies to gather information, for use in academic and policy research; and 
(3) advocating for individuals and groups who have been disproportionately harmed. 
Additionally, other forms of advocacy were also suggested, including amicus briefs, policy 
papers, and impact litigation. 
 
Europe and the United States must work together to protect online free expression and access. By 
analyzing failures of existing regulations and noting successes, academics and advocates can 
create better models for future regulations of online speech. Regulatory solutions for online 
speech issues must address the entire internet ecosystem. The ultimate goal for any new online 
speech regulation should be to best protect the ability for intermediaries to provide space for free 
expression online, while still protecting against destructive or harmful speech. Future 
international standards must also include perspectives from other nations and regions, as the 
internet is global. Collaboration between countries on online speech issues can be helpful and 
should be encouraged.  
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Workshop Agenda 
 
 
This detailed agenda includes framing discussion prompts and related questions. The discussion 
prompts and questions served as reference or inspiration for conversations.  
 
 
Session 1 : Free Expression Protections and Intermediary Liability 
Discussion Leads: Martin Husovec, Daphne Keller 
 
At the heart of the debate about intermediary liability and speech protections are a number of 
legal and constitutional questions. These include: the scope of fundamental rights protections; 
the question of state action and the delineation of public and private power; and the role that law 
has to play, alongside other forms of governance, in establishing the relationships among states, 
internet intermediaries and speakers.  
 
● What elements and requirements in intermediary liability law follow from constitutional 
and human rights law, and how does the former inform the latter? 
● What limits, if any, do constitutional and human rights frameworks place on laws that 
lead private platforms to silence lawful speech (i.e., privatized enforcement)?  
● Can states effectively bypass limitations on their own authority by delegating regulatory 
responsibility to private companies without appropriate safeguards? 
● What distinctions can be made between different types of speech intermediaries and their 
different responsibilities? On what basis should those distinctions be drawn? 
● What are the value and relevance of distinctions in existing safe harbors, like  CDA230, 
DMCA, and ECD? What are the value and relevance of the distinctions predating those 
laws? For example, one distinction is that between carrier, distributor, editor. 
● What are the implications of the cross-border nature of online speech platforms? What 
limitations follow from jurisdiction? 
 
Session 2: Black Letter Law and Facts on the Ground  
Discussion Leads: Daphne Keller, Joris van Hoboken 
 
Building on the first session’s discussion of constitutional and fundamental rights, this discussion 
will examine how those rights are protected -- or not -- by black letter legal doctrines and current 
platform and government practices. Discussion will cover, among other things, legal theories to 
challenge or defend state and private exercises of power over online expression. 
 
● How do specific doctrinal aspects of intermediary liability law -- including takedown 
procedures and concepts of “knowledge” or “neutrality” -- affect internet users’ free 
expression rights?  
● Are there persuasive rights-based arguments against laws requiring platforms to use 
technical filters to automatically block content?  
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● Can platforms be First-Amendment-protected speakers in cases defending their right to 
remove user-generated content, but also assert immunity as intermediaries when they fail 
to remove content? How does the European version of this dispute play out? 
● Does the law put any limits on the rules that platforms can incorporate in their 
Community Guidelines or Terms of Service? Should it? 
● Do doctrines from other areas of law, including telecommunications, media regulation, 
and antitrust, help in answering these questions?  
 
Session 3: Moving EU-US Dialogues Forward 
Discussion Leads: Martin Husovec, Tiffany Li 
 
In this session, we will look at what Europe and America can learn from each other, based on the 
discussions that we had in previous sessions. We will highlight and discuss commonalities and 
differences in E.U. and U.S. approaches to constitutional protection of speech. In particular, we 
will look at how lines of argumentation, legal concepts, and practical implementation of laws 
compare in the transatlantic context.  
 
● Do legal regimes in Europe and the United States conceptualize delegation of 
enforcement in the same way? Does the constitutional scrutiny differ depending on 
whether the state acts only by means of incentives, rising eyebrows, direct informal 
pressure, else? Does algorithmic enforcement require a distinct approach?  
● How can we effectively separate delegated enforcement and private ordering of content 
in the constitutional analysis? Where and how should we draw a line? 
● Do situations when the general monitoring obligation would violate free speech standards 
differ in Europe and the United States? 
● Is the European concept of positive obligations present in U.S. law? If not, what 
supplements its role? Do different policy areas such as hate speech, terrorist content, and 
copyright infringement require different types of analysis? 
 
Session 4: Future Models for Private Speech Regulation 
Discussion Leads: Tiffany Li, Joris van Hoboken 
 
This session will focus on future or alternative models of intermediary liability and private 
speech regulation, including extension or expansion of current models of speech regulation. 
Regulatory models for discussion will include but not be limited to: common carrier models, 
antitrust regulation, information fiduciaries, multi-tier regulations for intermediaries by type,  
hybrid public-private models, and more. If time allows, we will also share practical policy 
strategies to advocate for new or improved regulatory models. 
 
● What is missing in current legal and policy frameworks for intermediary liability and 
private speech regulation? What has changed about society or technology that demands a 
change in regulatory models? 
 19 
● What problems should future intermediary and speech regulation frameworks seek to 
solve? What values should they uphold or protect? How are these problems and values 
different from the problems and values that guided the development of the early 
intermediary liability regimes? 
● How should new frameworks take into account existing problems with intermediary 
liability regulations? Existing problems may include the problem of scale, jurisdictional 
conflicts, and the threat of Splinternet. 
● What are current trends (positive and negative) in intermediary liability and private 
speech regulation? What is working and what isn’t working? Are different jurisdictions 
moving toward similar shifts in intermediary regulation?  
● What are practical strategies to influence the development of future regulatory models for 
intermediary regulations in America and Europe?  
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The Wikimedia/Yale Law School Initiative on Intermediaries and Information is a research 
initiative that aims to generate awareness and research on intermediary liability and other issues 
relevant to the global open internet. WIII grew out of an ongoing academic affiliation and 
collaboration between Yale Law School’s Information Society Project and the Wikimedia 
Foundation and is made possible, in part, by funding from the Wikimedia Foundation, in support 
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at Stanford Law School and a part of Law, Science and Technology Program at Stanford Law 
School. CIS brings together scholars, academics, legislators, students, programmers, security 
researchers, and scientists to study the interaction of new technologies and the law and to 
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resources and analyses of policy issues arising at the intersection of law, technology and the 
public interest.  CIS also sponsors a range of public events including a speaker series, 
conferences, and workshops. CIS was founded by Lawrence Lessig in 2000. 
 
